Topic: OpenBSD and BIND 9 weakness

I thought this was interesting. … 0725193920

Jakob Schlyter (jakob@) wrote to misc@:

as some of you may have noticed, a new weakness in BIND 9 has
recently been discovered.  using this weakness, an attacker can
remotely poison the cache of any BIND 9 server.  the attacker can do
this due to a weakness in the transaction ID generation algorithm used.

when BIND 9 was first imported into OpenBSD, we decided not to use
the default ID generation algorithm (LFSR, Linear Feedback Shift
Register) but to use a more proven algorithm (LCG, Linear
Congruential Generator) instead.  thanks to this wise decision, the
BIND 9 shipped with OpenBSD does not have this weakness.

the proactive security of OpenBSD strikes again,



Re: OpenBSD and BIND 9 weakness

Yes it's interesting, they did the right job as usual - but nobody else cared about it.


Freedom is the sure possession of those alone who have the courage to defend it. --Pericles

Re: OpenBSD and BIND 9 weakness

I see the OpenBSD page now states:

"Only two remote holes in the default install, in more than 10 years!"

Wasnt this only 1 hole a little while ago? What did they find?

[ quote=lucas ]who wants to use sco unix?

if i were faced with either sco unix or linux, i'd shoot myself in the face[ /quote ]

Re: OpenBSD and BIND 9 weakness

2007-03-13: OpenBSD's IPv6 mbufs remote kernel buffer overflow … 0/threaded

Two in ten years, it's still a major achievement!

Trust me, I know what I'm doing.